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ABSTRACT
Although active ageing policy and practice vary between countries, we believe that knowledge 
about the effects of Norwegian companies’ initiatives to delay early retirement is of interest  
for all countries striving to increase the employment rates of older workers. Since the agreement 
on a more inclusive working life (IW agreement) was signed in 2001, the Norwegian govern-
ment and social partners have encouraged companies to develop a more senior-friendly policy 
and implement special measures to retain older workers. In this article, we evaluate the effects 
of such measures. Our research question is, have preventive measures offered by companies to 
employees aged 62 years and older contributed to reduced rates of early retirement? We use 
a ‘difference-in-differences’ approach and examine whether measures at the company level to 
counteract early retirement actually affect older employees’ retirement decisions, controlling for 
different individual and enterprise factors. This is done by comparing changes and differences in 
the individual likelihood of early retirement on the contractual pension (AFP scheme) and disability 
pension in the period 2002–2007 among employees 62 years of age in businesses with and 
without the corresponding preventive measures/instruments. The analyses show that the likelihood 
that a 62-year-old worker will retire on the AFP scheme has increased from 2002 to 2007. This 
applies equally to 62-year-old employees in enterprises that have enacted special measures to 
retain older workers as well as 62-year-olds in enterprises that have not enacted any such mea-
sures. On the other hand, the likelihood that a 62-year-old worker will retire because of disability 
decreased from 2002 to 2007, among employees in both the intervention enterprises and the 
control enterprises. However, when controlling for other relevant characteristics of individuals and 
enterprises, the analysis indicates that the measures as such have had no effect on the likelihood 
of 62-year-olds retiring.
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Background and research question
Internationally, people have long been concerned with senior policy as a way to tackle the challenge of an ageing population, and several studies of so-called ac-tive ageing policy and practice have been published, under the auspices of the EU 
(Taylor 2006; Walker 1997, 1999), the OECD (2006), and the European Trade Union 
Institute (ETUI; Jepsen et al. 2003). In this literature, the focus has generally been on 
employers’ attitudes, age discrimination, and the need for attitude campaigns and so-
called lifelong learning. One of the exceptions in this situation is Finland, where the 
researchers have primarily been concerned with working capacity (the Work Ability 
Index) and working environment (see, for example, Ilmarinen & Louhevaara 1999; 
Sterdyniak 2007). On the other hand, special senior-policy initiatives instigated by 
enterprises, of the kind we find in Norway, which include reduced working hours with 
and without wage compensation, bonuses and increased wages, longer holidays or 
more days off, etc. (Midtsundstad 2007; Midtsundstad & Bogen 2011b), are not wide-
spread in other countries (Taylor 2006), although focus on economic incentives and 
reduced working hours as effective means to postpone retirement are widespread in 
the international literature (e.g., Delsen & Reday-Mulvey 1996; OECD 2006; Taylor 
2006; Vickerstaff et al. 2009). However, there is little international research concern-
ing the effects of initiatives of this kind. The main aim of this article is to examine 
whether these senior-policy initiatives, offered by Norwegian companies, have had the 
desired effect on retirement behavior.
The Tripartite Agreement on an Inclusive Working life (the IW agreement) is, 
together with the ongoing pension reform, the Norwegian strategy to tackle the de-
mographic shift that endangers future labor supply and the sustainability of national 
pension systems. Since the parties in the Norwegian labor market and the Norwegian 
government signed the agreement in 2001, different workplace initiatives have been 
in focus to reduce early retirement. The employers are increasingly aware of the need 
for HR policies that take account of older workers: in 2010, half of all Norwegian 
employees were working in enterprises covered by the IW agreement, and nine out of 
ten IW enterprises had implemented senior or life-stage policies (Midtsundstad 2007; 
Midtsundstad & Bogen 2011b). 
The actual age of retirement in Norway has in fact increased since 2001 (Haga 
2010). However, whether the reduction in the rate of early retirement is a direct ef-
fect of the measures targeting seniors in the enterprises following from the IW agree-
ment remains unclear. A quantitative study conducted by Bowitz (2003) nevertheless 
indicates that these policies are effective, but produce different outcomes for men and 
women. However, his conclusion is based exclusively on data for employed older people 
(55–65 years), and the study investigates retirement preferences, not actual retirement 
behavior.1 On the other hand, a study of retirement on contractual pension (the AFP 
scheme) among a representative sample of employees and retirees in the public sector 
shows that facilitation and adaptation of job content and working hours have no effect 
on retirement behavior (Midtsundstad 2005b). Qualitative studies also indicate that 
the measures in use, bonuses and offers of reduced working hours, have little or no 
effect on retirement behavior or job availability among older people (see, e.g., Becken 
2011; Hilsen & Salomon 2010; Midtsundstad 2009; Midtsundstad & Bogen 2011b; 
Midtsundstad et al. 2012). 
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In addition to limitations imposed by the material or the methodology, a possible 
explanation for these varying, lacking, or conditional effects of policies for seniors 
could be that the applied initiatives fail to reach their target group or that the effects 
vary between sectors, industries, and professions. Thus, further analyses of the effects 
of the measures enacted by the enterprises are needed, and this motivates this article. 
The main research question of this article is, Do policies targeting workers aged above 
62 years reduce the individual likelihood of retiring on the AFP scheme or on disability 
at age 62?
We are using a “difference-in-differences” approach, where we compare the change 
in individual likelihood of early retirement for people aged 62 years in enterprises with 
and without special policies for seniors, during a period before the enactment of such 
initiatives (2001–2004) and a period after the introduction of such policies (2005–2007). 
The data comprise survey information on special senior-policy initiatives instigated by 
enterprises and registry information on retirement behavior and background character-
istics of all employees who turned 62 during the period from 2001 through 2007 and 
who were working in a representative sample of 713 enterprises employing ten people 
or more.
Before presenting and discussing the findings, we will define the concepts of work-
oriented policies for seniors and special measures for seniors. We will also provide a 
brief overview of previous research in this field, as well as a presentation of our data 
and methodology.
Theoretical basis and previous research
The explanations for early retirement are manifold and complex. Economic analyses 
primarily place the emphasis on the design of the pension system (pull factors): how 
payment levels and corresponding tax levels, age restrictions, and selection criteria 
serve to pull employees out of working life early (Hernæs et al. 2002). Other research 
has shown that early retirement is due to conditions in the workplace (push factors) 
as much as in the domestic sphere or the family (jump factors) (e.g. Hallberg 2007; 
Hauge & Årethun 2008; Larsen 2005; Lindquist & Wadensjö 2009; Midtsundstad 
2006; Philipson & Smith 2005; Steinum et al. 2007). In addition, a number of studies 
show that individual circumstances such as gender, age, education level, professional 
background and career, health, and finances also play an important part concerning 
the decision to retire, although their influences are different for different professional 
and educational groups (Hallberg 2007; Hauge & Årethun 2008; Midtsundstad 2002, 
2005a, 2005b). Well-educated people retire later than less educated people. And where-
as early retirement is related to health problems, heavy professional burdens, and long 
careers among blue-collar workers and low-ranking white-collar workers, these factors 
are less important among high-ranking white-collar workers and managers. For the 
latter groups, it is apparent that loss of interest and motivation regarding work can be 
just as important (Midtsundstad 2002, 2005a).
In other words, research on early retirement shows that workplace conditions also 
affect the decision to retire early, in addition to the design of pension systems, individual 
resources, and factors related to the domestic sphere or the family. This has provided the 
background for the efforts to implement policies for seniors at the workplace.
92 Effects of Companies’ Initiatives to Reduce Early Retirement Tove Midtsundstad et al.
However, there is little systematic knowledge of whether and to what extent active 
measures enacted by enterprises for their older workers actually have an effect on older 
workers’ retirement behavior. Available studies include trials that identify the effect of 
individual measures on the ability to work, job satisfaction, skills, job motivation, and 
coping (e.g., Hilsen & Salomon 2010; Hilsen & Steinum 2006; Ilmarinen & Louhevaara 
1999; Solem 2001). Studies under the auspices of the FinnAge programme, for example, 
claim to demonstrate that facilitation of a healthy lifestyle is essential to prevent a pre-
mature reduction in the capacity to work and function among older employees. Simi-
larly, a number of Finnish studies show that physical exercise arranged at the workplace, 
including various occupational therapy measures, have positive effects on the ability of 
health personnel to work (Parkatti et al. 1999; Pohjonen 2001). Other studies provide 
more detail to this conclusion, pointing out that this will only apply when the interven-
tions are targeted and succeed in reaching those who would otherwise not be physically 
active (see overview in NOU 2010: 13). 
Analyses of the causes of early retirement on the AFP scheme in Norway among 
public and private sector employees, respectively, nevertheless indicate that according 
to the older workers themselves, reduction and adaptation of workloads, such as ad-
aptation of job content and pace, have had an effect on decisions regarding retirement 
(Midtsundstad 2002, 2005b). Hurd and McGarry (1993) have also shown that the op-
portunity to move into a less demanding job (lighter workload) for the same employer 
tends to increase the likelihood of a desire to delay retirement. A study by Panis et al. 
(2002) came to the same conclusion. Some Finnish studies have also shown that adapta-
tion of shift-work schedules and various types of more convenient rota schedules have a 
positive effect on older workers’ health and ability to work (Kandolin 1999). 
Several case studies also suggest that development of competence and skills through-
out the entire working career may impact on whether the individual employee will be 
able to fulfill his or her job requirements, and that this will be particularly important 
in workplaces subject to continuous changes in job and skills requirements (Jørgensen 
et al. 2005; Ilmarinen 2003). However, only very few studies have actually demonstrated 
that those who receive continuous training provided by employers throughout their 
working careers in fact retire later than those who have had no such opportunity, ceteris 
paribus (Mayhew & Rijkers 2004; Philipson & Smith 2005). A Swedish longitudinal 
study of the effects of lifelong learning also fails to document that such interventions 
have an effect on retirement behavior (de Luna et al. 2008). 
In terms of policies for seniors and measures aiming to reduce the rate of early re-
tirement, the opportunities for flexible working hours, partial retirement, and reduced 
working hours with or without wage compensation have over time been regarded as 
suitable instruments for increasing the supply of labor among the elderly (see, e.g., 
Delsen & Reday-Mulvey 1996; OECD 2006; Taylor 2006; Vickerstaff et al. 2009). In 
spite of the widespread interest in and focus on such schemes on the part of politicians, 
employers, and employees alike (Midtsundstad 2005a, 2006, 2009b; Mykletun et al. 
2000; Stortingsmelding nr. 6 (2006–2007); Torgén et al. 2001), the documented effects 
remain inconclusive (Philipson & Smith 2005). 
The trials of six-hour working days in the Tine dairy concern have documented 
positive effects on individual job satisfaction and willingness to continue working with 
reduced working hours (Olberg 2006). Visser (2002), in his studies of the relationship 
between access to part-time work and employment rates in EU countries such as the 
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Netherlands, found that access to part-time work increased the employment rate of 
women significantly. Other studies suggest a similar effect on the job availability of 
young people, most likely because access to part-time work allows for a combination 
of work and studies (Ryan et al. 1991). Wadensjö (2006), who evaluated the Swedish 
public scheme for subsidized partial retirement (1976 to 2000), also concluded that the 
scheme had a positive effect on the supply of labor (number of hours worked), especially 
among women, but that the scheme needed to appear as financially attractive in order 
to produce any such positive effect. In addition to increasing the supply of labor by way 
of delayed retirement, such schemes are also assumed to have health benefits, thereby 
helping people maintain their ability to work and thus remain in the job for some ad-
ditional years.
Other studies, on the other hand, indicate the possibility that the opportunity for 
flexible retirement, especially in subsidized forms, would induce a larger number of 
those who otherwise would have continued working full-time to reduce their working 
hours, rather than encouraging a large proportion of those who otherwise would have 
retired to continue working (Becken 2011; Hilsen & Salomon 2010; Midtsundstad & 
Bogen 2011a, 2011b). A study of the effects of a partial retirement scheme at an Ameri-
can university (Allen 2004; Allen et al. 2003) also showed that the proportion opting for 
early retirement increased after the introduction of the scheme, even though the propor-
tion that chose full-time retirement was lower than the proportion that chose partial re-
tirement. The researchers also investigated the characteristics of those who chose partial 
retirement in contrast to those who opted for full-time retirement or full-time work and 
found that the partial retirees had most in common with those who continued to work 
full-time.
To investigate the assumed effect of instruments such as bonuses and higher wages, 
we can look at research on the impact of pension levels. This research shows that the 
pension level (degree of compensation) and financial incentives have an effect on the 
timing of retirement (Bratsberg et al. 2008; Hernæs et al. 2002). One may therefore 
expect that an increase in the wage level relative to the pension level would help delay 
retirement. On the other hand, studies show that fairly substantial additions or de-
ductions are needed to produce an effect on retirement behavior (Hernæs et al. 2000; 
Krueger & Pischke 1992). When asked directly, a minority report that they would delay 
their retirement as a consequence of higher pay (Pedersen 1997). Moreover, a study of 
retirement preferences after the pension reform among Norwegian private sector em-
ployees in 2010 indicates that even though many employees wish to work until a higher 
age, only a few wish to work full-time (Midtsundstad & Hyggen 2011). In other words, 
it remains uncertain whether the supply of labor will increase as a consequence of the 
incentives embedded in the pension reform.
There are nevertheless major differences between changes in the level of compensa-
tion paid as a consequence of amendments to national pension and benefit schemes on 
the one hand and supplementary compensation that is paid locally at the workplace on 
the other. For example, it is conceivable that being given priority by the job collective 
and the employers and receiving extra pay or a bonus locally will have some additional 
effects beyond the purely financial ones. This could, for instance, provide a sense of be-
ing appreciated. In qualitative interviews undertaken in enterprises that have introduced 
such schemes, this is a factor often referred to by the seniors themselves (see, e.g., Becken 
2011; Hilsen & Salomon 2010; Midtsundstad & Bogen 2011b).
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The review shows that few policies and facilitation programs for seniors have been 
evaluated, and that the correlation between the supply of labor by seniors and facilita-
tion for seniors, such as bonuses, subsidized reductions in working hours, and adapta-
tion of job content, is far from unambiguous. The effect of the interventions also appears 
to vary across industries, organizational forms, and types of labor (Midtsundstad & 
Bogen 2011b). For the latter reason, we will control for industry, educational level, type 
of work, and hours worked in the following analyses, since the type of work performed 
in the various industries will vary greatly. We will also control for some of the pull and 
jump factors that earlier research has shown influence the retirement decision, like in-
come and marital status.
Data, method, and model
The sample used when analyzing the likelihood of disability comprises all individuals 
turning 60 during the years 2001–2005, who were employed in any of the 713 establish-
ments that participated in a 2005 survey (N=1758) (Gravem & Villund 2007). When 
analyzing early retirement (AFP), the sample comprises all individuals working in the 
same 713 establishments and who turned 61 during the years 2001–2006 (N=4018). 
Data on individual characteristics, work, and retirement behavior have been drawn 
from Statistics Norway’s (SSB) registries, whereas establishment data, including data 
on the presence of measures targeting older workers, originate in the above-mentioned 
enterprise survey conducted in 2005. 
The prevalence of IW initiatives and active policies for older workers in the partici-
pating enterprises included special measures to retain employees who were 62 or over, 
most commonly in the form of facilitation of the workplace, options for reduced work-
ing hours without pay cuts, and bonuses for those who continued working after the age 
of 62 (Midtsundstad 2007). 
Since we are concerned with measuring the effects of policies for seniors, we need 
to measure changes in the individual likelihood of retiring on the AFP scheme or with 
disability benefits before and after the introduction of such policies. We are therefore 
using a so-called difference-in-differences approach, where we measure the change 
in the average likelihood of retirement over time between individuals with and with-
out access to interventions for seniors. This is the best available method for measur-
ing actual effects of interventions and regulatory changes (Angrist & Pischke 2009; 
Wooldridge 2006). The method presumes that one undertakes a natural experiment 
or an approximate natural experiment, in which two comparable groups have been 
subjected to two different schemes during the period of study (here: policies versus 
no policy). However, we only have data to tell us whether the enterprises have or do 
not have the policies in question during 2005, and we have no information on the 
year of their introduction in the individual enterprise. A representative study from 
2010 (Midtsundstad & Bogen 2011b) shows, however, that nearly all the enterprises 
had introduced such policies for seniors after 2004. We therefore assume that few, if 
any, of the enterprises in our sample enacted such policies in the period from 2001 to 
2004. On the basis of this assumption, we compare the likelihood of retiring on the 
AFP scheme or because of disability at age 62 prior to and after the introduction of 
special policies for seniors.
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The method also presumes that the samples are drawn randomly, giving equal 
likelihood of inclusion in the intervention group and the control group (Angrist & 
Pischke 2009). However, the group of Norwegian enterprises that have special poli-
cies for seniors is self-selected. Nevertheless, the distribution of older employees in the 
intervention group and the control group, respectively, of our sample can be assumed 
to be random, since individual employees have no effect on the introduction of such 
policies in their own enterprise. In addition, very few employees over 60 years of age 
actively seek out enterprises with such policies for seniors, since only very few change 
jobs after the age of 60.
The purpose of the analyses is to investigate whether working in an enterprise that 
has policies for older workers effects the likelihood of retiring on the AFP scheme or 
because of disability. That an enterprise has such policies means that the HR manager/
executive director of the enterprise in November–December of 2005 reported to have 
enacted one or more policies for the 62-year-olds with the purpose of encouraging them 
to keep working. A total of 55% of the municipal employees and 76% of the central 
government employees worked in enterprises that had enacted such policies in 2005, 
but only 30% of the employees in the private sector did so. The most common policies 
included extra pay or bonuses after a minimum of one extra year spent working, subsi-
dized reductions in working hours, extra days off, and/or adaptation of the job content 
(Midtsundstad 2007). 
In the analyses, we compare the individual likelihood of a 61-year-old retiring on 
the AFP scheme at age 62 in 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively, when no enterprises had 
enacted such policies, with the likelihood of a 61-year-old retiring on the AFP scheme at 
age 62 in 2005, 2006, or 2007, respectively, when a known selection of the enterprises 
had introduced such policies. The reason why we have chosen to investigate only the 
likelihood of retiring on the AFP scheme at age 62 is associated with the problems of 
selection bias and the fact that the effect of the policies can be assumed to be at its great-
est during the first year of entitlement to an AFP pension. Similarly, we compare the 
individual likelihood of an employed 60-year-old retiring because of disability some 
time during the year they turn 62 in a period when few or no enterprises had enact-
ed special policies for seniors, with a period during which a known proportion of the 
enterprises had introduced such policies. Our argument for doing so is that retirement 
on disability tends to be a process during which only very few move from employment 
to disability pension within one and the same year.
The analyses control for the following individual characteristics: gender (‘male’ is 
the reference category), level of education divided into primary/lower secondary (ref.), 2 
upper secondary, short and long university or university college education; net income 
(after tax) divided into percentiles; marital status, i.e., living in a one-person household 
(unmarried or widow/widower) or married/cohabiting and contractual working hours, 
i.e., full-time (ref.), long part-time (from 50 to 80% full-time equivalent), and short part-
time (less than 50% full-time equivalent). 
Furthermore, we control for the following characteristics of the enterprises: main 
profession in the enterprise,3 where we distinguish between workers (ref.), lower manag-
ers (routine non-manual employees), and upper managers (professionals, administrators, 
and officials); Public administration (ref.), teaching, health and social services, industry, 
construction, Hotels and  restaurants, wholesale and real estate and other industries; en-
terprise size, i.e., whether the enterprise has 100 or more employees or not; whether the 
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enterprise has an HR manager, no (ref.) or yes; whether the enterprise has undertaken 
any downsizing during the previous year or the first year in each period studied; and 
whether the enterprise is an IW enterprise or not, i.e., whether the enterprise joined the 
IW agreement in 2001, joined the agreement during the period from 2002 to 2005, or 
have not joined the agreement (ref.).4 
In Table 1, we show how the sample of older employees is distributed by the vari-
ous independent variables in the intervention enterprises and the control enterprises, 
respectively.
Table 1  Distribution of the independent variables, respectively, in the intervention group and the 
control group.









































Age 60 61 60 61 60 61 60 61
Women 49.7 44.4 50.0 40.7 36.6 43.3 36.4 45.2
Elementary  
school
18.3 18.8 21.9 21.2 18.1 13.3 17.8 17.4
Secondary  
school










7.7 8.6 8.7 10.6 13.4 12.9 8.6 10.0






















12.7 8.5 15.3 7.2 11.4 4.2 12.6 7.8
Part-time 
20–29 hours
17.0 12.7 7.0 9.0 7.9 7.6 9.8 8.4
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Full-time, 
30 hours or 
more
70.3 78.8 77.7 83.8 80.7 88.2 77.6 83.8
100 or more 
employees
80.0 75.0 65.0 68.2 78.7 79.5 71.1 70.0
Personnel 
manager
74.3 74.1 71.6 70.1 75.7 79.5 74.1 74.4
Layoffs this 
or last year
7.0 8.3 6.9 7.8 11.4 42.5 22.4 27.5









30.0 30.5 22.0 22.2 30.2 35.5 20.3 20.7
Public ad-
ministration
26.7 25.7 9.8 10.5 24.3 27.5 11.5 12.3




22.0 18.3 12.2 9.6 18.8 17.6 11.5 8.5
Industry 5.7 5.9 13.5 14.3 9.4 8.3 8.3 10.5
Construction 3.3 3.5 13.1 14.5 4.5 5.9 15.5 12.7
Hotels and 
restaurants




7.7 9.9 7.7 9.4 6.9 9.9 9.1 8.9
Other  
industries
23.0 25.7 8.3 9.3 25.3 22.6 13.1 16.0
Non  
IW-business
15.0 21.4 20.2 21.2 19.8 20.0 17.6 16.6
IW 2001 19.7 17.1 12.2 9.8 11.9 13.8 12.8 12.6
IW  
2002–2005
65.3 61.5 67.6 69.0 68.3 66.2 69.6 70.8
N 300 509 654 1089 202 659 602 1765
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As can be seen from Table 1, the employees in the intervention group and the control 
group are relatively similar in terms of gender, marital status, educational level, and aver-
age income. However, the intervention group has a slightly higher proportion of employ-
ees working part-time, most likely because the intervention group has a higher number 
of public sector enterprises, especially in health and social services. Furthermore, a higher 
proportion of the employees in the intervention group work in large enterprises (100 
employees or more) and enterprises that joined the IW agreement as early as 2001. The 
major difference, however, is associated with the distribution among industries. The in-
tervention group encompasses a far higher proportion of employees in enterprises domi-
nated by white-collar workers and enterprises in public administration and health and 
social services, and far fewer who work in enterprises dominated by blue-collar workers 
and enterprises in education, hotel and catering, manufacturing and construction. 
Results 
In the following analysis, we first investigate whether the likelihood of receiving a dis-
ability pension or an AFP pension at age 62 has changed more during the period from 
2002–2004 to 2005–2007 in enterprises that have enacted special policies for seniors, 
when compared with enterprises that have not introduced such policies. 
As shown in Figure 1, there has been an increase in retirement on the AFP scheme 
among 62-year-olds during the period we are studying. However, the increase has been 
slower among 62-year-olds working in the control enterprises than among the 62-year-
olds in the interventionl enterprises, contrary to what would be expected if the policies 
were effective. 
Figure 1:  Percentage of 61-year-olds who retired early with the contractual pension (AFP) as  
62-year-olds in firms with and without measures (2002–2006).
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On the other hand, as Figure 2 shows, there has been a decrease in retirement on dis-
ability pension in both the intervention enterprises and the control enterprises during 
the period we are studying, and for those who turned 62 years after 2005 the decrease 
in retirement has been somewhat stronger in the intervention enterprises than in the 
control enterprises.
However, in order for our model to measure the true effect of the policies, we need 
to assume that the groups are comparable over time. This is not very likely, we therefore 
control for a number of individual and enterprise-level characteristics that have been 
shown by previous studies to have an impact on the likelihood of early retirement (dif-
ferent pull, push, and jump factors) and, as Table 1 shows, also vary between the inter-
vention enterprises and the control enterprises in our sample.
In the following analysis, we study whether the fact of having or not having mea-
sures in order to delay retirement has an impact on the likelihood of receiving disability 
pension or AFP pension. These differences in average change are also referred to as a 
difference-in-differences estimator (Angrist & Pischke 2009; Wooldridge 2006). 
Since the dependent variables are binary categorical variables, we have used logistic 
regression. In Table 2, we report odds ratios with a 95% confidence interval. All models 
are also estimated as linear probability models, and these yield substantially identical 
results (not shown). All analyses were performed using Stata, version 10.1.
First, we investigate the total effect of the policy by including the policy itself, 
a dummy variable for the year, and the interaction between policy and year (the ef-
fect). This gives us an indication of the gross effect of the policy. However, it is highly 
unlikely that enterprises with policies are identical to those without in all other re-
spects, or that the people working in enterprises with policies are identically similar 
to those in enterprises without policies, as shown by Table 1. We have therefore 
Figure 2:  Percentage of 60-year-olds (2001–2004) who were receiving disability benefits as  
62-year-olds (2002–2007) in firms with and without measures.
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Table 2  Individual probability of receiving an early retirement benefit or a disability benefit among 
62-year-olds, depending on the measure exposure, before and after controlling for a range 









OR OR OR OR
Women 0.925 1.132
Living alone 0.669*** 1.357
Elementary school (ref) 1.000 1.000
Secondary school 0.855 0.771
Lower degree university/college 0.877 0.603**
Higher degree university/college 0.768 0.447*
Income percentile 0.991*** 0.995
Full-time, 30 hours or more (ref) 1.000 1.000
Part-time 20–29 hours 0.727** 1.478
Part-time <20 hours 0.974 12.050***
100 or more employees 1.167* 1.362*
Personnel manager 0.848* 0.881
Layoffs this or last year 1.253** 0.757
Workers (ref) 1.000 1.000
Routine non-manual employees 1.400*** 0.623**
Professionals, administrators,  
and officials
1.121 0.535**
Public administration (ref) 1.000 1.000
Teaching 1.514** 1.460
Health and social services 0.669** 0.700
Industry 2.147*** 0.787
Construction 2.146*** 1.117
Hotels and restaurants 1.563** 1.409
Wholesale and retail trade 1.835*** 1.194
Other industries 2.325*** 0.915
Non IW business and  
IW 2002–2005 (ref)
1.000 1.000
IW 2001 0.829 1.061
Measures 0.718 0.762** 0.745 0.848
Change from first period to  
second period
0.937 0.956 0.598*** 0.561***
Measures* change 1.280 1.273 0.998 1.035
Pseudo R2 0.002 0.037 0.012 0.197
N 4018 4018 1758 1758
*: p< = 0.05; **: p ≤ 0.01; ***: p ≤ 0.001
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included a model that allows us to control for various individual and enterprise char-
acteristics.
The analysis shows that the policies for seniors have no significant effect on the 
likelihood that the 62-year-olds will retire on the AFP scheme, as can be seen in Table 2. 
This is evident both before and after control for the selected individual and enterprise-
level characteristics.
On the other hand, whether you live alone or not, the net after-tax income level of 
the 61-year-olds and their contractual working hours have an effect on this individual 
likelihood. The probability that a 62-year-old will retire on the AFP scheme decreases 
with increasing income. The probability to retire is also lower for those living alone 
compared with those not. Older employees who works part-time (20–30 hours a week) 
also have a significantly lower likelihood of retiring on the AFP scheme at age 62 than 
other 62-year-olds who work full-time. Furthermore, those working in large enterprises 
with 100 or more employees compared with those working in smaller enterprises and 
those working in enterprises which experienced downsizing have a higher probability to 
retire compared with employees in enterprises with no such experience. Moreover, those 
not working in public administration and health and social service and those working 
in enterprises dominated by routine non-manual employees have a higher probability 
to retire than those working in other industries and enterprises dominated by manual 
workers. The other control variables have no effect on the likelihood of retiring with an 
AFP pension.
The analysis of the effect of the policies for seniors with regard to the likelihood 
of being retired on disability pension at age 62 while having been employed at age 60, 
shown in Table 2, shows that providing the policies from age 62 has no significant ef-
fect in this respect. This can be observed both before and after control for the relevant 
individual and enterprise-level characteristics.
However, employees with higher education and employees working full-time have a 
lower probability to retire on disability pension than employees with elementary educa-
tion and employees working part-time (less than 20 hours per week). Furthermore, those 
working in large enterprises with 100 or more employees compared with those working 
in smaller enterprises and those working in enterprises dominated by white-collar work-
ers and not blue-collar workers have a higher probability to retire. The other control 
variables have no effect on the likelihood of retiring with a disability pension.
Discussion
The results of the analyses show that working in an enterprise that provides special poli-
cies for seniors to workers from age 62, like bonuses, reduced working hours, and extra 
days off, does not have an effect on the likelihood of a 61-year-old receiving an AFP 
pension at age 62 nor on the likelihood of a 60-year-old retiring on a disability pension 
two years later, i.e., at age 62.
In both cases, this is evident both before and after controlling for some of the known 
individual risk factors such as gender, level of education, level of income, material status, 
and contractual working hours, as well as after controlling for enterprise characteristics 
such as the number of employees, the presence of a separate HR manager, layoffs during 
the period, the main profession in the enterprise, industry, and the time of joining the 
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IW agreement. This means that the absence of any effects cannot be ascribed to differ-
ences in these respects between individuals working in intervention enterprises and those 
working in the enterprises that constitute the control group. 
One explanation of the absence of any effect could be that we only have informa-
tion on whether the enterprises have introduced the policies described, but we do not 
know whether each individual employee has received this option. With regard to the 
policies for seniors, however, this explanation is not very likely; since we know from 
other studies (e.g., Midtsundstad 2007, Midtsundstad and Bogen 2011b) that such ini-
tiatives are usually open to everybody in the enterprise, from the same age onward. Some 
are nevertheless excluded, for example, those who have a small full-time equivalent in 
the health and care sector. In our sample, altogether about 12% of the 61-year-olds were 
working short part-time or had a contractual full-time equivalent of less than 50%.
The fact that the typical policies targeting employees who are 62 or over fail to 
have an effect may also be due to the fact that those who are entitled to such initiatives 
are a strongly selected group of people who can be assumed to be more healthy and 
motivated for work than the cohort as a whole, since a large proportion of employees 
retire on disability before they turn 60. In other words, the policies may appear to be less 
important for the selected group, since they already constitute a relatively healthy and 
well-motivated group of employees.
The absence of effect may also be associated with the types of policies that the en-
terprises provide for the majority of their employees from age 62. In most enterprises, 
the initiatives include various forms of financial incentives such as reduced working 
hours with full wage compensation or bonuses/increased wages (Midtsundstad & Bogen 
2011b). Several studies also show that a considerable proportion of older employees 
claim that they would continue working if they were granted bonuses or higher wages 
or reduced working hours with full wage compensation (Midtsundstad 2006, 2009b; 
Mykletun et al. 2000). However, for such initiatives to have an effect, more leisure time 
and money must be the factors that best fit the needs of employees who normally retire 
at age 62. Previous studies indicate, however, that those who wish to retire at age 62 tend 
to report health problems and physical and mental strains on the job as the main reasons 
(Midtsundstad 2006). Therefore, the typical initiatives offered by Norwegian enterprises 
in 2005 will not necessarily meet the needs of the seniors. 
In the analyses, we have had no access to data that would have allowed us to control 
for factors related to health status, the working environment, and working conditions, 
which in previous studies have proven to be a significant explanation for why elderly 
employees take early retirement. It is therefore conceivable that the working conditions 
and the working environment in enterprises that offer facilitation and/or special initia-
tives for seniors are on the whole less favorable than in enterprises that do not provide 
such initiatives, thus providing an explanation for the absence of any effects. This means 
that the initiatives may have an effect, but this is not sufficient to counterbalance the 
negative effects of the working environment. We do, however, control for level of educa-
tion, main type of profession in the enterprise, and industry. This may nevertheless fail 
to capture all the differences in working conditions between individuals working in the 
same types of industries.
It also bears mentioning that the intervention enterprises do not constitute a random 
sample, but are self-selected since the enterprises may independently decide whether or 
not to join the IW agreement and establish various forms of facilitation and initiatives 
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for seniors. This may have an impact on the results, provided that the factors that in-
duce the enterprise to establish policies for seniors also have an impact on the likelihood 
of employees retiring because of disability or on the AFP scheme, all else being equal. 
However, we are measuring the changes in the individual likelihood of early retirement, 
not the changes in the enterprises’ rates of early retirement as described in the intro-
duction, and there is a significant likelihood that the distribution of elderly employees 
between the intervention enterprises and the control enterprises is random, even though 
the sample of intervention enterprises and control enterprises is not. 
Last but not least, an absence of effects could be caused by what we may refer to 
as a kind of national “Hawthorne effect.” This means that the intensified political focus 
and debate over the last decade with regard to an inclusive labor sphere and the need for 
a reduction in the rate of early retirement may have influenced all Norwegian enterprises 
and employees, irrespective of whether the enterprises have chosen to establish policies 
for seniors or not. This “opinion and attention effect” during the business boom from 
2001 to 2007 may thus have been stronger than the effects of the policies as such.
In line with this reasoning, it may also be that the general good economic situation 
of older workers in Norway and increased average incomes among seniors during the 
last decade have influenced the retirement decision for most Norwegian seniors and 
hence weakened the possible influence of the common measures offered, like bonuses 
and subsidized work time reductions. According to economic theory, increased income 
increases the preferences for leisure (the income effect), everything else being equal.
Conclusion
In this article, we investigate whether the enterprises’ independently initiated policies 
for seniors had an effect on the likelihood of elderly employees retiring on a disability 
pension or on the AFP scheme during the period from 2001 to 2007. We study whether 
the individual likelihood of receiving an AFP or a disability pension at the age of 62 has 
decreased more for employees who are working in enterprises that have enacted special 
policies for those who are 62 or older than for employees who work in enterprises that 
have not introduced similar initiatives. We use a “difference-in-differences” approach, 
whereby the changes in the individual likelihood of retiring on a disability pension and/
or an AFP pension are compared for enterprises that have such policies and those that 
have none, controlled for a number of individual and enterprise-level characteristics. 
The analyses show that the initiatives commonly offered by Norwegian enterprises 
and often recommended in the international literature, like reduced working hours, ex-
tra day off, and economic incentives, fail to produce the expected effects. We can never-
theless observe a reduction in the rate of early retirement on disability pension among 
the 62-year-olds during the period of study. However, we cannot ascribe this reduction 
in the probability of receiving a disability pension to commonly offered initiatives for 
seniors since we are unable to demonstrate statistically that the development of the 
individual likelihood of retiring on a disability pension has differed for employees work-
ing in enterprises that have enacted the policies in question, when compared with those 
working in enterprises without such initiatives. Even after controlling for exposure to 
the policies, we find that known risk factors such as level of education, income, material 
status, and type of enterprise remain decisive. In other words, it appears as though the 
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policies followed by Norwegian enterprises in late 2005 have failed to delay or reduce 
the rate of early retirement.
Special policies for seniors may nevertheless still have an effect. As indicated by 
previous studies, the lack of effects may be associated with the specific types of initia-
tives that are provided: for example, with regard to whether they fulfill the needs of the 
employees in question. Furthermore, the lack of effects may be caused by the terms of 
the allocation criteria and allocation routines that have been established, for example, 
whether or to which degree all those who need special facilitation are entitled to it and 
are familiar with their options, as well as whether those who grant such facilitation have 
sufficient time and resources to implement the policies, assess individual needs, and fol-
low up each individual employee.
Research has shown that the causes of early retirement are complex and are gen-
erated by a number of different factors within as well as outside the workplace. The 
various factors also have a varying degree of importance for different professions and 
educational groups. One would therefore assume that in order to be effective, the ini-
tiatives and instruments launched to prevent early retirement would need to vary be-
tween professions, industries, and sectors. However, they do not in Norway today. 
The options and the allocation criteria are surprisingly similar across industries and 
enterprises, despite the heterogeneity of needs, problems, and challenges. This can be 
observed between as well as within the individual enterprises (Midtsundstad & Bogen 
2011). Emphasis is placed on measures such as reduced working hours with full pay, 
extra days off and/or bonuses, and only to a lesser extent on facilitation and adaptation 
of the job situation. The age requirement for eligibility or provision of special measures 
also appears to be excessive in some industries (62 years). Those groups of workers 
who are at risk of disability and may have the most pronounced need for facilitation 
will therefore not invariably be able to benefit from the special policies for older work-
ers. The senior policies operating in the current Norwegian labor market are thus not 
very accurate and appear to have the character of benefits for older workers who would 
have continued working anyway rather than of effective measures to reduce the rates 
of early retirement. 
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End notes
1  In other words, a possible selection bias has not been taken into account. By interviewing 
only those who have continued working, a large number of those who have taken this op-
tion to retire at age 62–65 years have been left out. In addition, other research tells us that 
there can be a major difference between the time someone reports to wish to retire and the 
reasons for doing so (retirement preferences) on the one hand, and the time of actual retire-
ment and reasons for doing so on the other (retirement behavior).
2 Including those with unknown education and those with education not stated.
3  Classifying the different occupations, we have used Erikson Goldthorpe coding based on 
the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO88) (Leiulfsrud et al. 2005). 
However, we have classified nurses as workers, and not as non-manual employees, since 
nurses’ work to a large extent is manual and physical rather than purely administrative. In 
addition, previous studies imply that this might influence sickness absence and early retire-
ment behavior (cf. e.g. Midtsundstad and Bogen 2011b). 
4  IW enterprises have access to some public services that are unavailable to others. This 
includes a designated contact person in the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administra-
tion (NLWA), and previously they could also use active sick leave without prior approval 
from NLWA (the scheme has since been discontinued). In addition, the employees have an 
expanded entitlement to use self-reporting of absence due to illness (maximum 24 days per 
year, as opposed to 12 for others). Furthermore, the enterprise health services in IW enter-
prises use a separate set of rates for refunds by the National Insurance Service.
